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Abstract
The structure of communication networks can be more or less 
“democratic”: networks are less democratic if (a) communication 
is more limited in terms of characteristic degree and (b) is more 
tightly channeled to a few specific nodes. Together those measures 
give us a two-dimensional landscape of more and less democrat-
ic networks. We track opinion volatility across that landscape: the 
extent to which random changes in a small percentage of binary 
opinions at network nodes result in wide changes across the net-
work as a whole. If wide and frequent swings of popular opinion 
are taken as a mark of instability, democratic communication net-
works prove far more stable than anti-democratic ones. In a final 
section, we consider the democratic or anti-democratic character 
of networks that respond to volatility by rewiring at random, in a 
search for community, or in a search for a leader.
Keywords: democracy, network, opinion, volatility, agent-based 
¿Qué tan estable es la democracia? 
Sugerencias de redes sociales artificiales
Resumen
La estructura de las redes de comunicación puede ser más o menos 
‘democrática’: las redes son menos democráticas si (a) la comunica-
ción es más limitada en términos del grado característico y (b) está 
más estrechamente canalizada a unos cuantos nodos específicos. 
Juntas estas medidas nos dan un panorama bidimensional de redes 
más y menos democráticas. Seguimos de cerca la volatilidad de la 
opinión a través de ese panorama: el punto hasta el que los cam-
bios al azar en un pequeño porcentaje de opciones binarias en los 
nodos de la red resultan en cambios importantes en toda la red. Si 
se toman las fluctuaciones importantes de opinión popular como 
una marca de inestabilidad, las redes de comunicación democráti-
ca parecen ser más estables que las que son antidemocráticas. En 
una sección final consideramos el carácter democrático o antide-
mocrático de las redes que responden a la volatilidad al reescribir 
al azar, buscando una comunidad o buscando un líder.
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“Opinion volatility” and “opinion variability” have been used in the literature 
in a number of different ways (Acemo-
glu, Como, Fagnani, & Ozdaglar. 2013; 
Bybee, McLeod, Luetscher, & Garra-
mone, 1981; Powell & Tucker, 2009). 
The terms “democracy” and “demo-
cratic” have a notoriously wide range of 
meaning (Levinson, 2006; Storm, 2008). 
“Political instability” appears in impor-
tantly different senses as well (Hurwitz, 
1973; Sottilotta, 2003). In what follows 
we explore a particular type of opinion 
volatility in a particular sense of dem-
ocratic networks, with implications 
that are suggestive for some among the 
many questions of political stability.
Democratic Communication 
Networks
It is clear that some forms of gov-ernmental procedure count as more democratic than others do. It is also 
clear that certain forms of social orga-
nization count as more democratic than 
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others do. In the latter case, what is at 
issue is less a matter of formal political 
process than of communication: the 
more democratic networks are those 
in which communication is egalitarian, 
open, and diverse.
Figure 1 shows a random net-
work on the right, contrasted with a 
network generated by preferential at-
tachment on the left (Barabási & Al-
bert, 1999; Newman, 2005). Of these, 
we would propose, the random network 
is more democratic. This corresponds 
to an aspect often emphasized in the 
literature: equality of participation 
(Edelsky, 2004). It is taken as a mark 
of democracy that “no-one can choose 
himself, no one can invest himself with 
the power to rule and, therefore, no one 
can abrogate to himself unconditional 
and unlimited power” (Asgary, 2005; 
Walt, 2000, p. 36) and that “all have a 
right to participate in making the deci-
sions that will affect us” (Brooks, 2012, 
p. 20). In a preferential attachment net-
work, communication is predominant-
ly with and through a small number of 
“hubs”—the local warlords, bosses, au-
tocrats, or authoritarian figures. Only 
a few individuals have contact with 
many; the many have contact-mediat-
ed predominantly by the privileged or 
powerful few. In a random network, the 
number of contacts for each individual 
is much more equally distributed, with 
a network of communication wider and 
more diverse. The social network that 
results has the look of communication 
in a small American town, perhaps. In 
what follows we formalize the extent to 
which attachment in a network is pref-
erential, with the proposal that it is net-
worked with concentrated hubs that are 
less democratic.
Figure 1. A less democratic network in terms of preferential attachment (left) contrasted  
with a more democratic communication network on the right.
We also use a second measure 
of democracy in communication net-
works. Figure 2 shows two networks 
that contrast only in their mean node 
degree. Of these, we propose, it is the 
higher-degree network on the right that 
is more democratic. Various commen-
tators have emphasized this primary as-
pect of democracy in terms of freedom 
of expression and assembly (Brooks, 
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2012) and broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultation (Parris, 
2008). In the network on the right, more people are in communication with more 
people, approaching the ideal of a New England town meeting. Higher mean de-
gree, we propose, offers a second dimension along which we can measure increas-
ingly “democratic” networks.
Figure 2. A less democratic network (left) and more democratic (right) in terms of higher 
node degree and wider contact.
We consider the idea of more 
and less democratic communicative 
networks a natural one, with a charac-
teristic degree and preferential attach-
ment as natural measures. Our formal 
treatment of the first will be in terms 
of mean node degree: the higher the 
mean node degree of a network, the 
more democratic we take it to be in the 
second sense. Our formal treatment of 
how preferential the attachment struc-
ture of a network is will be in terms of 
the preferential exponent. 
Consider the prospect of adding 
a new node to an existing network of 
nodes xi … xn (Barabási & Albert, 1999; 
Newman, 2005). The probability that 
1 “Approaches” because nodes formed early in the process do have increased chances of being con-
nected to by newly added nodes. We can create a continuum from more truly random networks to 
those of higher preferential attachment by eliminating the assumption that our network is formed 
node by node. In that case we regard all nodes in the network as formed ab initio and proceed either 
node by node or by random choice of node, applying the exponential function above to the totality 
of n nodes.
the new node will be connected to a 
specific node xj can be given as: 
Here dj represents the degree of 
node j and             represents the sum 
of degrees of all nodes, but in each case 
those degrees are raised to our preferen-
tial attachment exponent e. Where e = 
0, (dj)e for any node = 1, and thus a new 
node attaches to existing nodes with no 
preference between them in terms of 
relative degrees. The result approaches 
a random network.1 Where e = 1, (dj)e is 
simply (dj), and a new node attaches to 
an existing node simply as the ratio of 
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its degree over the total sum of degrees 
in the existing network: the standard 
pattern for preferential attachment. As 
e is increased to higher positive values, 
however, the bias in favor of nodes with 
higher degree is exaggerated. We can, 
therefore, generate the extent of prefer-
ential attachment by simple adjustment 
of the preferential attachment exponent 
e.2 Figure 3 shows typical networks gen-
erated with an e of 0, 1, 2, and 3. 
Each of the networks shown in 
Figure 3 is generated with an average 
degree of only two. For networks with 
2 In Barabási and Albert (1999), the authors note the possibility of using an exponent in this way, 
but confine their attention entirely to e =1 on the grounds that it most clearly models the scale-free 
networks that are their target. On the use of a variable exponent, see also Krapivsky, Redner, and 
Leyraz (2000); Dorogovtsev, Mendes, and Samukhin (2000); and Noble, Davy, and Franks (2004).
higher degrees, a new node will con-
nect to one of those to which it is not 
already connected with a probability 
measured by our preferential exponent. 
For networks with an average degree of 
3, for example, increased preferential 
attachment will take the form of those 
networks shown in Figure 4. With e = 
3 and higher we get not one focus of 
preferential attachment, for example, 
but two. 
When plotted on two axes, our 
two measures allow us a landscape of 
networks more or less democratic in the 
e = 0           e = 1                    e = 2                            e = 3
e = 0          e = 1                  e = 2                            e = 3
Figure 3. Networks with increasing preferential attachment in networks of mean degree 2.
Figure 4. Networks with increasing preferential attachment in networks of mean degree 3.
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two dimensions of increased average 
node degree and increased preferential 
attachment exponent. Those networks 
that are more democratic in terms of 
mean degree we will plot farther to the 
left on the x-axis, reversing the num-
bering of mean node degree in order 
to do so. Those networks that are more 
democratic in virtue of low preferential 
exponent will be plotted further to the 
bottom on the y-axis. The array of net-
works used in what follows is illustrated 
in Figure 5. Across that array, the most 
democratic network in terms of both 
dimensions—high node degree and low 
preferential attachment—is on the low-
er left. The least democratic network in 
terms of both dimensions—low degree 
and high preferential attachment—will 
be on the upper right. 
Figure 5. An array of more or less democratic networks on two dimensions: preferential 
exponent and average node degree.
Our focus here is opinion vola-
tility across this landscape of networks 
more or less democratic on these mea-
sures. We make no claim, however, that 
these two initial measures should be 
treated as exhaustive; we remain active-
ly interested in the possibility of using 
other measures of democratic and an-
ti-democratic networks as well. 
We are also fully aware of the 
distance between this minimal model 
of selected aspects of communication 
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and the messy complexities of real so-
cieties, democratic, or otherwise. Any 
two nodes in the modeled networks 
have either a fully open communica-
tion link or no communication link 
at all, for example, with no attempt to 
model the topic-specific censorship 
that often characterizes authoritarian 
regimes. Within the networks consid-
ered, moreover, distinctly layered hi-
erarchical structures do not have the 
clear prominence that they often do in 
social organization. Here, as elsewhere 
in modeling, the goal is not a detailed 
representation of reality but an inten-
tionally schematic diagram that helps 
us understand it. Abstract as this model 
is, the hope is that attention to the dy-
namics of abstractly modeled opinion 
on this selective landscape of artificial 
networks can start to give us a grasp 
on the far messier volatility of opinions 
within far more complex social struc-
tures. 
3 There is a range of related work on voter model variations on complex networks, though without 
the focus on political implications explored here. See, for example, Castellano, Villone, and Vespig-
nani (2003); Suchecki, Equíluz, and San Miguel (2005); Sood and Redner (2005); Schneider-Mizell 
and Sander (2009). 
Opinion Volatility
Consider the 50-node network shown in Figure 6. We begin with a percentage of agents in 
the network holding opinion p, cod-
ed in green, with another percentage 
holding opinion not-p, coded in red. At 
each step of the simulation, we have a 
certain percentage of our agents update 
their opinions using a simple majority 
version of the threshold model (And-
jel, Liggett, & Mountford, 1992; Durrett 
& Steiff, 1993; Liggett, 1999). Agents 
adopt the opinion held by the majority 
of those with whom they are in contact 
in the network, with a random choice 
in the case of a tie.3 In what follows we 
have a random 10% of our agents up-
date on the majority view of their net-
work contacts.
In order to measure volatility 
within different networks we introduce 
Figure 6. Initial configuration of opinion network.
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background noise: at regular intervals, 
we make a small percentage of random 
agents change their opinions. In what 
follows we have a random 5% of the 
agents in a network change their opin-
ions every tenth generation. We think 
of this as a background rate of sponta-
neous belief-change by some percent-
age of individuals in the network.
The measure we are after, how-
ever, is what impact that background 
rate of belief change will have on the 
Figure 7. Different patterns of opinion volatility stimulated by a background change in a  
small percentage of nodes.
Journal on Policy and Complex Systems 
96
volatility of beliefs across the network 
as a whole. In some cases, in some net-
works, a changed percentage of nodes 
may have little more impact than that 
change itself, giving the pattern of a 
random walk in small steps illustrated 
in Figure 7a. In other cases, in other 
networks, the impact of a small changed 
percentage may be much greater, with 
wider swings and reversals of domi-
nance, as in 7b. Given some initial pat-
terns of belief and some network struc-
tures, a small percentage may produce 
repeated cascades of changed opinion 
amounting to the wide swing of dom-
inant opinion shown in 7c.
How does network structure 
correlate with opinion volatility in this 
sense? We measure changes in the con-
figuration of belief on a network that 
are greater than 150% of the change 
artificially introduced as background 
noise. We track both the frequency 
with which changes of that size occur 
in different networks—the percentage 
of cases in which the introduction of a 
random change in beliefs of 5% of the 
population change leads to a greater 
than 7.5% swing in over-all beliefs—
and the amplitude of change when it 
does occur. We measure amplitude as 
the difference in the number of agents 
holding p at the point of noise introduc-
tion and the number holding p in the 
next time interval. At points of volatili-
ty in a network, what percentage of the 
network changes beliefs?
The radical simplifications in-
volved in the model should again be 
emphasized. We are dealing with a sin-
gle binary issue and an extremely sim-
plified concept of belief change. The 
dynamics involved, however, are not 
entirely out of range as an idealization 
of important aspects of opinion change 
across a community. There are indeed 
issues that can be phrased as binary 
choices, and attitudes are indeed sub-
ject to the kind of conformity pressure 
modeled here in terms of deference to 
the majority of contacts (Asch, 1952, 
1955; Bond & Smith, 1996; Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004).
Just as we would not claim our 
measures of democratic networks to 
be exhaustive, we would not claim our 
measures of instability to be exhaustive, 
even with regard to opinion instability. 
Within the constraints of those mea-
sures, however, we can ask a very simple 
question of our simple models:
In terms of both frequency and 
amplitude, how does the volatility or 
stability of opinion correlate with the 
democracy or anti-democracy of a 
communication network?
Opinion Volatility in 
Democratic and Anti-
Democratic Regimes
In the graphs that follow, we map our two dimensions of network “de-mocracy” on two axes, as outlined 
above. The x-axis shows a decreasing 
mean degree in sample networks—de-
creasingly democratic networks in that 
sense—from left to right. The y-axis 
shows increasing preferential expo-
nent—decreasing democratic networks 
in that sense—from bottom to top. Net-
works most democratic in both regards 
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will be at the lower left, with high de-
gree and low preferential attachment. 
Networks least democratic in both re-
gards will be at the upper right, with a 
low degree and high preferential attach-
ment.
How does opinion volatility cor-
relate with the democracy or anti-de-
mocracy of a network? Using 100-node 
networks, we introduce a background 
belief change in 5% of the nodes at each 
10th iteration over 10,000. The percent-
age of cases in which the result is great-
er than 7.5% change in beliefs across 
the networks we count as the frequen-
cy of volatility. Figure 8 shows results 
in which we average frequency results 
over 100 runs for each combination of 
mean degree and preferential exponent. 
What is immediately clear from 
Figure 8 is that networks democratic in 
the sense of low preferential attachment 
Figure 8. Frequency of volatility across democratic and anti-democratic networks.
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and high average degree show the low-
est frequency of volatility in the range 
measured. Here networks remain much 
in the same proportions of opinions de-
spite small random changes in individ-
ual beliefs. The frequency of volatility 
increases as one move to networks in 
the upper right that are anti-democratic 
in having high preferential attachment 
and low degree. Here the devil is in the 
details, however, including details that 
we cannot claim to fully understand. 
The point with the highest frequency is 
that in which extremely low degree cor-
relates with a preferential attachment 
exponent between 1 and 2; higher pref-
erential attachment actually dissipates 
the result. The core tendency, however, 
Figure 9. The amplitude of opinion volatility across democratic and anti-democratic  
networks.
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is strong and obvious: the frequency of 
volatile opinion changes increases with 
the anti-democratic character of com-
munication networks. 
Figure 8 tells only half the story, 
however: these graphs show the fre-
quency of volatility but not the ampli-
tude. When a 5% change produces a 
more than 7.5% reaction, what is the 
size of that reaction? What percentage of 
the network changes beliefs as a result? 
Across the same array, the answer to this 
second question appears in Figure 9.
Here results are even more strik-
ing. Networks democratic in the sense 
of having low preferential attachment 
Figure 10. Multiplied measures of frequency and amplitude: a societal hazard map for 
opinion volatility.
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show low volatility amplitude across all 
node degrees. With an average degree in 
the democratic range above 5, the am-
plitude of volatility remains low despite 
increases in the preferential attachment. 
Once the preferential attachment ex-
ponent rises above 2 and average node 
degree falls below 5, anti-democratic 
networks show a steady and significant 
increase in volatility amplitude, ap-
proaching network changes of 75% on 
the right edge of the graph. Measured 
in terms of amplitude, anti-democratic 
networks prove far more volatile than 
do democratic networks.
Within the constraints of our 
model assumptions, the results seem 
importantly suggestive. What they sug-
gest is that anti-democratic communi-
cation networks can be expected to be 
significantly less opinion-stable than 
democratic networks. What our models 
suggest, for example, is that the destabi-
lizing influence of wide swings of opin-
ion can be expected to occur with both 
greater frequency and greater depth 
across decreases in the two dimensions 
outlined for democratic networks.
We can further underscore these 
suggestions by combining our two 
measures of volatility. We simply multi-
ply frequency of opinion volatility—the 
percentage of cases in which opinion 
change exceeds 150% of randomly in-
troduced change—times the amplitude 
of volatility—the percentage of the pop-
ulation that shifts opinion. The result, 
shown in Figure 10, is something like 
a hazard map for opinion instability in 
the designing of social institutions.
What the results indicate is that 
the communication networks most vul-
nerable to volatility overall—consider-
ing both frequency and amplitude—are 
those that are least democratic on both 
of our measures: the networks with a 
low mean degree and high preferential 
attachment at the upper right. Those 
least affected by volatility overall are 
networks democratic on both our mea-
sures.
Shifting Networks, Democratic 
and Anti-Democratic
Opinion volatility is a plausible measure of instability in a net-work of political actors. 
If an individual finds himself re-
peatedly torn between radically opposed 
opinions based on shifting opinions 
among his pattern of contacts, he seems 
likely to change his pattern of contacts. 
The result will be a change in the struc-
ture of the communication network: the 
network can be expected to rewire in re-
action to opinion volatility.
If an abstract network rewires 
because of opinion volatility, in what 
direction can we expect it to change? 
In the model outlined, anti-democrat-
ic networks prove less stable in terms 
of opinion volatility. If those networks 
rewire in response to that instability, 
do they inevitably become more dem-
ocratic? However, democratic networks 
are not immune from opinion volatility, 
either. Where democratic networks re-
wire, do they tend to become less dem-
ocratic?
In the rewiring considered here, 
new links are created as old links are 
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broken and thus average network de-
gree will remain the same. We concen-
trate, therefore, on changes in the pref-
erential attachment. In initially creating 
networks above, we used a preferential 
exponent in the generating formula. 
Here we introduce another measure de-
signed to gauge preferential attachment 
in networks at any stage, however they 
have been formed or transformed.
Figure 11. Sample democratic means for different degree distributions.
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The measure we use is the demo-
cratic mean, more sensitive for our pur-
poses than Gini coefficient and easily 
applicable to networks before and after 
rewiring. Ours are connected networks, 
without isolated nodes. A network with 
a high preferential attachment will have 
a wide range in degree—many nodes 
will have few connections; a very few 
will have many. The ratio of the mean 
degree over the span between least and 
highest degree will, therefore, be a small 
number. A network with a low prefer-
ential attachment will have a much 
smaller range in degree, with the result 
that the mean degree over the differ-
ence between highest and lowest will be 
relatively large. The democratic mean 
is the ratio of a mean degree over the 
highest degree: the higher the demo-
cratic mean, the less the preferential at-
tachment of a communication network 
and the more democratic the network is 
in that sense.
More formally, where dmax is 
the degree of the most connected node 
and dmin the degree of the least con-
nected, we take the degree spread D as 
dmax − dmin. With dm as our mean 
degree, the democratic mean of a net-
work is (dm − dmin)/D. For a 50-node 
network with extremely high prefer-
ential attachment—49 nodes with 1 
connection and 1 node with 49, for 
example—the democratic mean will 
approach .96/48 or .02. In a random 
network with a normal distribution 
between 1 and 3 connections, on the 
other hand, the democratic mean will 
approach .5. Sample network distribu-
tions typical of those considered here, 
with corresponding democratic means, 
are shown in Figure 11.
How will a network rewire in 
response to volatility? We start with a 
network generated with a particular 
preferential exponent, then rewire in 
response to volatility. Will democratic 
communication increase, as measured 
in terms of a democratic mean, or not? 
Volatility, as above, is stimulated 
by the direct change in a random 10% 
of our nodes at regular intervals over 
the course of a run. Here we count as 
“volatile” those nodes that change more 
often than they are directly changed: 
nodes that change opinion at least 
1.5 times as often as they are directly 
changed by the program. These vola-
tile nodes are those that are vulnerable 
to opinion change from changes else-
where in the network as well. In all cas-
es, we assume that it will be the volatile 
nodes that break links, replacing them 
with links to nodes. We consider each 
of the following as possible patterns for 
rewiring in response to 
Random Reaction: Rewiring at 
Random within the Network 
There is something about the re-
inforcement pattern of volatile 
nodes that makes them unstable. 
They, therefore, break a link at 
random and establish a replace-
ment link to another node in the 
network, chosen at random. In 
the end, we can expect volatili-
ty to die down, but with a newly 
structured network in its wake. 
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Figure 12. Change in democratic mean with different forms of rewiring in response to 
volatility, shown for networks with initial preferential exponents between 0 and 3.5.
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Search for Community: Rewiring at 
Random to another Oscillator
In the revision, volatile nodes re-
wire at random only within the 
set of volatile nodes in general: a 
search for community. The idea 
here is that opinion-vacillating 
agents recognize others with the 
same difficulty, breaking ties at 
random but establishing new ties 
with other volatile nodes. Here 
too we can expect a different net-
work structure as a result. 
Search for a Leader: Rewiring with 
Preferential Attachment among 
Oscillators
In a third form of rewiring, nodes 
favor other volatile nodes but re-
wire in preferential attachment 
to other volatile nodes that have 
the most connections: a search 
for a leader. 
For 50-node networks initial-
ized with preferential exponents at .1 
intervals between 0 and 3.5, 10% of the 
population was given random opinion 
changes every 10 ticks of a run, with re-
wiring in terms of volatility measured 
after 50 of those changes. Is there a dif-
ference in the new networks that form 
with each of these forms of updating—a 
difference that shows up in a change of 
democratic mean? We performed 1,000 
runs with each form of rewiring, taking 
the average democratic mean of both 
the initial network and the result after 
100,000 ticks. 
The results for each form of re-
wiring are shown in Figure 12. 
Rewiring in response to volatility 
results in more democratic communi-
cation networks with either of two first 
forms of rewiring: when that rewiring 
is either to random nodes or to other 
volatile nodes at random. Within the 
100,000 tick limits of our study, the final 
democratic mean is lower for networks 
that start with high initial preferential 
attachment, though the percentage of 
change for those is even more dramatic.
One of the interesting aspects 
of this result is that all the networks 
considered become more democratic 
with these two forms of rewiring. This 
includes even those networks that are 
initially the most “democratic” in our 
sample—those on the lowest end of our 
preferential exponent scale. As noted 
in passing, even networks formed ini-
tially with a preferential exponent of 0 
are not purely random. The order of at-
taching new nodes in sequence, in the 
manner of Barabási and Albert (1999), 
inherently biases degree distributions 
in favor of the first nodes. With rewir-
ing to either other nodes or other vola-
tile nodes at random one typically gets 
a network more random than one with 
preferential attachment 0—a network 
even more democratic than those on 
our initial scale.
The third case, however, is differ-
ent. Rewiring as a “search for a leader,” 
itself following a pattern of preferen-
tial attachment among volatile nodes, 
results in a more democratic network 
only when the initial network had a 
preferential attachment of greater than 
1.1. For networks that are initially more 
democratic than that, volatility rewir-
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ing in a “search for a leader” results in a 
less democratic network.
Two related observations are of 
particular note with regard to rewiring 
in response to “search for a leader.” Both 
of these we consider worthy of further 
investigation. The first observation is 
that there is a tipping point at an initial 
preferential attachment exponent of 1.1 
or so: below that, point networks be-
come more democratic with rewiring; 
after that point, they become less dem-
ocratic.
The second observation is “search 
for a leader” results in virtually the 
same level of democratic mean regard-
less of the initial preferential attach-
ment of the network. “Leader-search-
ing” rewiring in response to volatility, 
whatever the original network, results 
in a democratic mean of approximate-
ly .13, corresponding to a preferential 
attachment exponent of approximately 
1.1. Interestingly, this is very close to 
the preferential attachment exponent 
that Barabási and Albert claim to be 
particularly characteristic of scale-free 
networks across a wide social and eco-
nomic range (Barabási & Albert 1999).
Conclusion
In broad strokes, at least, our results accord with a range of research in political communication. Social 
media has emerged as a major tool for 
the spread of information in both au-
thoritarian regimes and western de-
mocracies. Several previous studies 
indicate that it is authoritarian regimes 
that prove most vulnerable to that wid-
er information (Loader & Mircea, 2011; 
Shirky, 2011). A specific example is the 
powerful role of social media during 
the Arab Spring (Sottilotta, 2003; Ste-
panova, 2011), in which multiple au-
thoritarian regimes demonstrated sud-
den and unexpected volatility. We also 
find our results to be consistent with the 
vast literature in American politics em-
phasizing the central role of open and 
high-quality information in the health 
of a democracy (Gillens, 2001; Leven-
dusky, 2013; Prior, 2017; Van Aelst et 
al., 2017).
The models explored here are 
minimal models, clearly abstracted 
from a messier reality in a number of 
crucial ways. Unlike the social networks 
that are their target, the networks em-
ployed here are carefully constructed 
in terms of two variables representing 
aspects of democratic communication: 
characteristic node degree and extent 
of preferential attachment. With those 
radical simplifications in mind, what 
we claim is a series of intriguing sug-
gestive results regarding stability and 
democracy.
In detail, our results are nuanced, 
with important specifics most clear-
ly illustrated in the graphs above. As a 
rough overview in summary, however, 
what our results suggest is that abstract 
anti-democratic networks, measured 
with parameters of relatively low node 
degree and relatively high preferential 
attachment, may prove inherently un-
stable in an intriguing way. Anti-dem-
ocratic networks seem to exhibit a 
higher propensity for opinion volatility, 
including volatility across large blocks 
of the population.
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Were one to try to design a social 
structure that encourages wide swings 
of opinion, these results suggest, one 
could hardly do better than a structure 
with low node degree and high prefer-
ential attachment. Were one to design 
a structure that most effectively diffus-
es widespread opinion volatility, that 
structure would be democratic both in 
the sense of high characteristic node 
degree and low preferential attachment. 
Within the limits of the study, dem-
ocratic networks prove significantly 
more stable in terms of both frequency 
and amplitude of opinion volatility.
We have taken volatility further 
as a sign of network instability, treating 
instability in turn as a plausible predic-
tor of dynamic network change. Where 
networks do change in response to re-
wiring of volatile nodes, the change in 
networks structure very much depends 
on the form of rewiring at issue. If vol-
atile nodes reconnect to other nodes 
at random or to other volatile nodes at 
random, the result is a clear and robust 
increase in the democratic mean of a 
network. If, on the other hand, volatile 
nodes reconnect preferentially to that 
volatile node with the highest number 
of existing connections—a “search for 
a leader” in the form of preferential 
attachment—networks with high pref-
erential attachment may become more 
democratic but those with low prefer-
ential attachment consistently become 
less democratic. Precisely why the tip-
ping point is where it is and why “search 
for a leader” seems to lead to the same 
democratic mean regardless of the ini-
tial structure are issues that call for fur-
ther investigation.
The results remain suggestive, but 
intriguingly so. Volatility studies within 
carefully constructed networks suggest 
is that anti-democratic communication 
networks may prove more vulnerable to 
de-stabilizing opinion volatility. Where 
networks change in response to that 
volatility, both random rewiring and 
“search for community” lead to more 
democratic communication networks. 
“Search for a leader” may not.
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